【英文】卡托研究所报告：美国制造业危机：去工业化，自由市场和国家安全（60页）

Aggregate employment trends also say little  about the ability of U.S. workers to produce essential goods during a national emergency. For  example, U.S. manufacturing employment increased by almost 1 million jobs between 2010  and 2018, “outperforming” Germany, Japan,  and China in the process. However, over the  same period, real manufacturing value-added  per worker and per hour worked in the United  States increased by only 0.3 percent per year  and 0.1 percent per year, respectively, as compared to 5.6 percent and 5.7 percent per year  between 2000 and 2008—a time of signifcant  manufacturing job loss in the United States.14 In other words, American workers were improving their ability to produce manufactured  goods (and thus to supply the economy in  times of war or other emergency) at a much  more rapid pace during the height of “deindustrialization” than during the subsequent period of “reindustrialization.” 

In reality, neither  job gains nor job losses demonstrate a vibrant  (or lagging) American industrial sector. There  also is little to indicate that U.S. manufacturing jobs deserve special government support.15 GDP SHARE. Manufacturing’s declining share  of total U.S. GDP also refects secular trends  largely disconnected from U.S. government  policy. First, the change in the industrial  sector’s GDP share refects the relative  strength of the U.S. services sector instead  of the weakness of American manufacturing.  Indeed, between 1997 and 2019, real gross  output and real value-added of private services– producing industries increased by 87 percent  and 77.4 percent, respectively, while the same  metrics for U.S. manufacturing increased  by a slower-but-still-respectable 18.7 percent  and 52.8 percent—continuing long-term trends  in these U.S. sectors dating back to the 1940s.