【英文】彼得森经济研究所报告：美国如何推动半导体产业进入与中国的贸易战（34页）

The 1980s began a period in which semiconductors were central to major trade  conflicts. In contrast to today, the US industry was the instigator of the fight. The  sector began to organize itself politically when Intel and four other IDMs formed  the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), in 1977.7 Table 1 provides a timeline  of key policy events starting then.  In 1981–82, the semiconductor industry fell into a cyclical downturn in the  midst of a US recession. Japanese firms enjoyed major gains, especially in  the DRAM market. The SIA pressed the US government for action, blaming  Japanese nontariff barriers and subsidies. The response was a US–Japan High  Technology Working Group, which negotiated over 1982 and 1983 for greater US  participation in the Japanese market. The limited policy change to emerge from  the negotiations was that each country agreed to reduce its Most Favored Nation  (MFN) tariffs on semiconductors.8 

As industry conditions improved, US concerns  with Japan temporarily went away.  The industry began to suffer again in 1985, however, and the SIA became  more aggressive in demanding government action. With the continued  appreciation of the dollar and a growing trade deficit, the Reagan administration  became more hospitable to the industry’s demands, seeing semiconductors as  one more in a long series of trade concerns with Japan.9 In June 1985, the SIA  officially filed a petition under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, voicing three  issues. The main complaint was that the US industry lacked access to Japanese  firms using semiconductors. Despite Japan’s removal of quotas beginning in  1975 and its later reduction of its tariffs, the US industry remained stuck at little  more than 10 percent of the Japanese market. The other two complaints involved  Japanese government policies that encouraged dumping by Japanese firms in  the United States and in third markets.