【英文】美国会研究服务部报告：印度和美国的关系（49页）

There appear to be limits to the extent to which Indian leaders will concretize bilateral security  relations with the United States. Despite Delhi’s engagement with the Quad, in July 2020, India’s  external affairs minister insisted that India will “never” be part of an alliance system. 43 Asummer  2020 survey of figures from New Delhi’s policy community found them predicting that India will move closer to the United States, but that a security alliance is unlikely and India should not  expect the United States to get involved in a ground war in the Himalayas. 44 India is expanding its defense relations with other Indo-Pacific states. In late 2019, India inked a  defense cooperation agreement with the Indian Ocean island nation of Comoros and, along with  France, has vowed to help with economic development there, as well as in three other Vanilla  Island states (Madagascar, Seychelles, and Mauritius).

New Delhi is moving to expand defense  relations with Indonesia—including with “coordinated patrols” by naval forces—as well as  undertaking new outreach to the IOR island nations of Maldives and Mauritius. In March 2021,  India notably signed a deal to sell its Brahmos cruise missiles to the Philippines.46 European Union nations, along with other Indo-Pacific states, increasingly are cooperating with  and supporting the Quad, leading some analysts to encourage development of a “Quad Plus”: A  “minilateral engagement in the Indo-Pacific that expands the core Quad 2.0 to include other crucial emerging economies.” South Korea, Vietnam, and New Zealand are listed among the  prime candidates for such an effort. India already has developed defense relations with many. 47 In  early 2021, the French, British, and German navies have increased their presence in the IOR amid  mounting suspicions of China. In April, French naval forces joined with those of the Quad for  drills in the Bay of Bengal.