【英文】澳洲智库报告：澳大利亚如何面对中国日益扩大的军事影响力（41页）

China appears to be building a force specifically intended to be able to  eject the US military from the western Pacific by force, to stare it down  in a crisis, or to encourage the United States to step away from its  current commitments due to overstretch, defeatism, 62 or frustration  with allies. The latter could be inflamed by a perceived lack of  commitment from some allies,63 particularly given the clear scale of the  threat. While the degree of any such development could vary widely,  even a partial withdrawal of US power from the western Pacific would  accelerate the ongoing deterioration in the regional military balance,  with profound consequences on the freedom of action of regional  nations like Australia. 

Probably the worst-case scenario for Australia’s security would be one  where something like the following sequence occurs: 1. China  successfully gains control of Taiwan either through force (invasion,  bombardment, or blockade) or the threat thereof — say, Taiwan  negotiates terms given an ultimatum, particularly if it senses wavering  US commitment. 2. After China consolidates Taiwan, piercing the First  Island Chain and gaining control of ports and airfields in eastern  Taiwan, Japan undergoes at least partial ‘Finlandization’ 64 and requests  the departure of US forces from the country. 3. Having now been  relieved of the necessity to dedicate resources to the capture of  Taiwan, China is able to dedicate its attention to addressing security  challenges further afield.the region. 

Given the growing regional challenge from the PLA, the  United States could as a result adopt an ‘offshore balancing’ strategy,  essentially withdrawing its main forces to the central or eastern Pacific  and again exposing regional powers to a rapidly declining military  balance. This also could inspire the self-neutering of formerly powerful  regional allies such as Japan and South Korea, releasing Chinese  resources and attention for employment further afield.