【英文】瑞银报告：如果疫情控制失败怎么办？全球宏观策略报告（56页）

In our early March attempt to set out various Pandemic scenarios we had assumed  that a handful of economies (no more than 5) would follow China and Italy in  imposing severe mobility restrictions. That may seem nonsensical now, but this was  just before the virus really took off and it was not yet clear how politicians would  respond to the advice they were getting from medical professionals. Our forecasts  at the time were significantly below consensus. However, they were also out of  date within about a week, as more and more countries started to impose Italianlike restrictions. Rather than 'a handful', we now rate 33 out of 42 economies  under our coverage as having 'severe' mobility restrictions. And, as a result, our  baseline growth forecast for 2020 (-3%YoY) is now nearly 400bp below our worst  case scenario from two months ago. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between  mobility restrictions and growth outcomes (for an explanation see this report and  for the latest ratings this spreadsheet).

However, even our current -3% forecast may prove far too optimistic. It assumes  that mobility restrictions start to get lifted throughout May, and that activity  returns to a degree of normality by end Q2/early Q3. Modally that may still seem  possible—as the heatmap on the next page shows, economies other than China  have started to ease restrictions—but the lifting is slow and there is a significant  risk that the virus count flares up again. The purpose of this report is to try to show  how things might evolve if that assumption is wrong: what if severe mobility  restrictions are extended all the way to end June? Or what if the virus is not  contained and keeps coming back in waves until the middle of 2021?