【英文】兰德报告：印太地区国家对中美竞争的反应（新加坡篇）（66页）

英文研究报告 2020年11月27日 08:53 管理员

The final quantitative variable measures Singaporean support for or opposition to major U.S. security initiatives or efforts. It includes support (or lack thereof) for major U.S. efforts related to North Korea, including efforts to disrupt North Korean ship-to-ship transfers; participation in South China Sea (SCS) patrols, operations, or major exercises with the United States in SCS international waters; engagement in Taiwan Strait transits; support for U.S. freedom of navigation operations; participation in major U.S.-led military operations; and participation in coalition efforts to defeat the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). As illustrated in Figure 1.1, the United States retains the advantage in the competition for diplomatic influence with Singapore. It also shows greater support for the U.S. vision for the region than for the Chinese vision.

However, our research suggests that maintaining U.S. competitive advantage in Singapore will face significant hurdles in the coming decade, particularly as an increasingly competitive U.S.-China relationship has the potential to undermine Singaporean economic growth and stability. The U.S.-Singapore relationship is a success story: Singapore has been and remains a dependable partner for U.S. diplomacy and security efforts in Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific region more broadly. Singapore provides operational and logistical support for U.S. forces astride one of the world’s most important sea lanes and has punched well above its weight as a diplomatic proponent for rules-based behavior in regional disputes. To sustain this success in ways that will buttress U.S. competitive advantage will require a steady hand at the helm of the relationship, strengthening ties across diplomatic and security domains while recognizing the importance to Singapore of stable relations with and growing ties to China.