【英文】布鲁金斯学会报告：中国的北极的野心和行动（73页）

Chinese economic statecraft is feared by some in the Arctic and around the world. Beijing  has at times made clear to those states it targets how large its economy is relative to  theirs, and how little bilateral leverage they therefore possess. But the conventional  wisdom on the Arctic’s dependence on China is overstated, and the Arctic’s most  vulnerable economies actually export more to the United States than they do to China  — and significantly more to Europe.  The Arctic includes eight states, but three of these — the United States, Russia, and Canada  — have large economies that could withstand a degree of Chinese economic coercion. By  contrast, the smallest Arctic economies include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and  Sweden. 

These states, referred to here as the “Arctic Five,” presumably have the least  leverage vis-à-vis China and therefore would theoretically have the greatest dependence. Publicly available trade data, however, suggests this dependence is limited. 136 The  percentage of “Arctic Five” exports that goes to China is far lower than what goes to the  United States and its European allies and partners. In 2019, China accounted for an average of 4.0% of exports for the five “Arctic Five”  countries (ranging from 2.5% for Iceland to 5.3% for Finland), less than the United States (an  average of 6.2%, ranging from 4.3% for Norway to 7.6% for Sweden) and far less than the  other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and/or the European Union  combined (an average of 70.3%, ranging from 59.8% for Denmark to 81.2% for Norway).