【英文】美国智库报告：谁失去了阿富汗？”vs“为什么我们败了”（63页）

英文研究报告 2021年08月02日 07:49 管理员

It must be stressed that the analysis which follows is not based on access to either classified data or the full record of what went wrong in the training and the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) formation and deployment process. If the U.S. is to really learn from the history of the war, it requires open and transparent historical analyses of all the available information. It also requires analysis of what might have happened if aid and support had been conditional and based on actual Afghan performance and if the flaws in Afghan forces and the ways they were supported have been openly and honestly reported in ways that might have created more pressure to actually address them.

If the U.S. is to learn from the military side of the Afghan conflict it must fully examine all of the classified and open source data that traces the resurgence of the Taliban from 2002 onwards, including sources of support such as the role Pakistan played it giving it some degree of sanctuary as well as the role power brokers and narcotics played in weakening government forces and funding the Taliban. It must analyze the impact of corruption and poor leadership in the Afghan government on the Taliban’s return to given portions of Afghanistan. It also must fully and honestly assess the major mistakes the U.S. and its allies made in shaping Afghan security forces – many of which repeated mistakes the U.S. made in Vietnam. It also must look beyond the war in Afghanistan. Some of the delays in, and under-resourcing of, U.S. efforts to create effective Afghan security forces were driven to some extent by the growing U.S. focus on Iraq. This led to efforts to shift too much of the training and support mission to allied countries.