【英文】NBR报告：应对中国的军事挑战，美国盟友和伙伴应如何集体应对？（96页）

It is far more costly for Taiwan to purchase additional Patriot missiles from the United States  than for Beijing to simply build more DF-series ballistic missiles and launchers. Compared to the  PLA, Taiwan’s military is also much more constrained by the availability of land and manpower.  It is, therefore, unlikely that Taiwan could feld many more Patriot or other SAM units. In recent  years, the PLA reportedly has also made signifcant advances in developing Weishi-family  long-range rockets and other multiple-launch rocket systems capable of attacking a target area  hundreds of kilometers away, although their deployment and exact accuracy have not yet been  confrmed.11 In a confict with Taiwan, the PLA could exploit these less accurate but even cheaper  and more numerous projectiles as a suppression weapon in the frst waves of attack. Taiwan’s SAM  units would be forced to intercept them with the precious interceptors loaded in the launchers,  only to be overwhelmed by more accurate DF missiles coming in immediately aferward. 

Taiwan  is playing a losing economic game and will never build up sufcient interceptors to match the  number of PLA missiles and other ofensive weapons.  In a 2017 study using geographic information system techniques, I identifed that the most  advanced PAC-3 missile units of Taiwan’s military were all deployed near major cities.12 Taiwan’s  defense planners apparently intend to use their most capable anti–ballistic missile interceptors to  protect population centers rather than air force bases. However, there is no evidence suggesting  that Beijing intends to use ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads to attack Taiwan’s  major cities, a move that would be wasteful, inefective, and serve no apparent military purpose.