【英文】哈德逊研究所报告：夺取对中国的制高点，实现美国的海军航空优势（60页）

英文研究报告 2022年08月16日 07:40 管理员

Naval aviation has a storied history of commanding the seas during World War II and the Cold War, but as threats to sea control abated following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, naval air forces shifted to projecting power through strike operations ashore. Although Navy and Marine Corps aviators flying into Kosovo or Iraq faced some Soviet-era air defenses, their carriers were able to safely operate close to adversary coastlines, allowing frequent sorties with moderate need for aerial refueling.6 The uncontested maritime conditions of post-Cold War regional conflicts are unlikely to recur against even a regional power like Iran, and certainly not against major powers China and Russia. Aircraft carriers and airfields will face salvos of ballistic and cruise missiles within 2,000 nm of China’s mainland or Chinese-controlled maritime features and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) bombers could extend that range to more than 3,500 nm.

Figure 2 summarizes the throw weight of weapons potentially facing US forces in a confrontation against China in 2030, but likely underestimates the threat posed by the PLA, which has consistently modernized and grown its capacity faster than US intelligence community projections.It is unlikely, however, that the PLA would limit its weapons expenditure to 10 percent of its inventory if it were engaging a US CSG, and follow-on attacks by PLA air forces would be likely. As a result, the CSG would see larger initial salvos or sustained salvos that would exceed its defensive capacity once the CSG’s escorts depleted their vertical launch system (VLS) magazines. Sensor countermeasures, often touted by Navy leaders as protecting carrier operations closer to China, are unlikely to defeat the PLA’s robust and overlapping surveillance network over the Western Pacific unless carriers also restrict maneuvers and flight operations, reducing their relevance.