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【英文】新美国安全中心报告:台海危机升级管理(20页)

英文研究报告 2023年03月24日 07:26 管理员

A more survivable and diverse nuclear arsenal provided  Red with coercive options. A larger, more diverse nuclear  arsenal not only increased the survivability of China’s  second-strike capability but also gave the Red teams  the ability to threaten or employ nuclear weapons in a  limited fashion. There did not seem to be a diference in  the Red teams’ behavior based on whether they had 700  or 1,000-plus nuclear weapons, nor did it change Blue’s  views on Red. Neither team in either TTX felt the need  to employ a nuclear weapon against an enemy early in a  Taiwan confict, because they also had improved conventional capabilities. Both Red teams issued nuclear threats  at the start of the war to dissuade the United States  from getting involved. One Red team eventually used  a low-yield weapon against Guam in response to Blue  attacks on China’s mainland. In short, the Red teams felt  that they had a secure second-strike capability and were  better positioned to brandish nuclear weapons coercively  and employ them if necessary. 

China does not need to  quantitatively match the United States’ nuclear capabilities for it to become a far more signifcant nuclear threat.  RECOMMENDATION  Continue to explore how China might use nuclear  weapons in a war over Taiwan and in other scenarios.  Given the uncertainty about China’s nuclear policy and  doctrine, it is important to consider how China could use  the weapons it is developing. Although China may claim  that it does not intend to employ nuclear weapons except  in retaliation for a nuclear attack, its policy and doctrine  could change. The United States has built up decades of  accumulated research on Russian nuclear weapons and  doctrine, and it needs to begin a similar research agenda  for China.  FINDING  Red saw little advantage in the employment of nuclear  weapons early in a Taiwan confict. Because China’s  conventional capabilities are expanding with its nuclear  capabilities, the Red teams did not feel pressured to use  nuclear weapons early in a confict, although they were  willing to brandish them. In their view, nuclear weapons  were best used to shift the balance of resolve and compel  the United States and Taiwan to capitulate.

【英文】新美国安全中心报告:台海危机升级管理(20页)

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