【英文】兰德报告：中美战略竞争中的中国全球影响力评估报告（168页）

In addition to considering common interests and purposes in this category, we consider  common perceived threats, which can contribute to whether countries are aligned. Even countries with significant differences can find common ground in a shared threat. In the case of  the focus countries, most in Asia harbor a perception that China poses at least some threat,  which creates a natural alignment—if muted and incomplete—with the United States. This  emerges in various ways and to various degrees in different countries and among different  interest groups in those countries. For example, in the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte  and some key cabinet members are more skeptical of the U.S. relationship, while those in the  military and security services continue to view China as a significant threat and value the U.S.  alliance.

Broadly speaking, notable fear of the Chinese threat exists in at least eight of the 20  focus countries, and very few, if any, perceive a threat from the United States. Identity Narratives  A second variable in this category considers identity narratives, particularly the degree to which  a targeted country’s self-conception or identity clashes in some way with China’s. This could  be true, for example, if a country believes it has a natural right to regional leadership in a way  that collides with China’s presumption of eventual regional hegemony. We found four cases in which national self-conceptions created clearly divergent interests with China: India, Indonesia, Japan, and Vietnam. All four countries view themselves as  having rightful degrees of regional influence that would appear to clash with China’s conception. There are other cases in which smaller countries may have well-developed identities of  independence and autonomy that conflict with China’s presumed degree of control. Examples  are Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore.