【英文】哈佛大学肯尼迪学院报告：阿富汗的例子：介入容易出局难（68页）

The dissolution of the Soviet Union efectively ended the Cold War  and lef the United States as the most powerful, secure, and prosperous nation in the world. Te resulting military superiority, lack of  rivals, and vast wealth provided the U.S. with unparalleled freedom to  indulge in well-intended global missions to shape the world without  seemingly incurring signifcant risks or consequences. In the 1990s,  the U.S. advanced its interests to promote democratic governance and  free market economies, foster individual freedom, and protect human  rights. However, afer the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, U.S.  foreign policy focus shifed to combatting and defeating terrorism,  predominantly in the Middle East and Africa. 

These missions would  cost nearly $5.4 trillion and approximately 15,000 American lives.1 Unfortunately, the shortcomings of the U.S. war on terror policies over  the last twenty years have repeatedly prevented the U.S. from achieving its envisioned outcomes of defeating terrorism and reshaping  fragile regions in its own image. Te United States’ inability to achieve  its desired defnition of success in its missions against terrorism has  not been due to challenges by more powerful and strategically savvy  enemies. Nor has it been due to insufcient expenditure of resources,  nor to a lack of war-fghting experience. Instead, the lack of success  has been far more due to shortcomings of U.S. foreign policies themselves. Tey have entangled the U.S. in protracted wars on terror and  hindered its ability to secure its own interests in these conficts.