【英文】海外发展研究所报告：中国远洋捕鱼船队：规模，影响和治理（48页）

We assume that this remote observation of a  vessel’s presence overseas grants high confdence  that it is engaged in DWF operations. If we  consider only this group – discounting all other  results – the fgure of 12,490 vessels is still 3.5  times larger than the estimate of Pauly et al. (2014). We also identifed 3,541 vessels with either  a registered intention to fsh overseas or in  contact with Chinese enforcement agencies in  circumstances that strongly imply engagement  in DWF fshing. These included Chinese-fagged  vessels: with IMO numbers (Extraction 1),  registered with RFMOs (Extraction 2), registered  with the Chinese DWF association (Extraction  6.4), inspected by Chinese authorities outside  Chinese waters during 2018 (Extraction 6.2),  or registered as exported or seized by Chinese  customs agents (Extraction 6.3).  Additionally, we identifed 927 vessels fagged by  other countries that have associations with China  that we assume are signifcant. These include  vessels built in or previously fagged to China, or  with a Chinese interest, meaning that they have  a current or previous Chinese name, operator  or owner. 

These vessels may be fagged to other  nations but were operated by Chinese businesses  or their subsidiaries, contributing to China’s supply  chains and international fshing effort.  Our identifcation of vessels as members of the  DWF feet does not imply that all are operating  currently, simultaneously or consistently in  foreign or international waters. This is partly  due to gaps in the available data, and partly due  to the criteria used to identify the DWF feet.  Krakken®’s records are not updated in real time  and do not refect the current status of some  vessels. For example, Krakken® may record a  vessel as being operational during 2017, but not  record that it was decommissioned in early 2018.  There are 58 Chinese vessels whose last record  in Krakken® was ‘active and operational’ before  1989; these vessels may no longer be operational.