【英文】兰德报告：中美战略竞争中的中国全球影响力评估报告（168页）

英文研究报告 2021年07月12日 07:53 管理员

In addition to considering common interests and purposes in this category, we consider common perceived threats, which can contribute to whether countries are aligned. Even countries with significant differences can find common ground in a shared threat. In the case of the focus countries, most in Asia harbor a perception that China poses at least some threat, which creates a natural alignment—if muted and incomplete—with the United States. This emerges in various ways and to various degrees in different countries and among different interest groups in those countries. For example, in the Philippines, President Rodrigo Duterte and some key cabinet members are more skeptical of the U.S. relationship, while those in the military and security services continue to view China as a significant threat and value the U.S. alliance.

Broadly speaking, notable fear of the Chinese threat exists in at least eight of the 20 focus countries, and very few, if any, perceive a threat from the United States. Identity Narratives A second variable in this category considers identity narratives, particularly the degree to which a targeted country’s self-conception or identity clashes in some way with China’s. This could be true, for example, if a country believes it has a natural right to regional leadership in a way that collides with China’s presumption of eventual regional hegemony. We found four cases in which national self-conceptions created clearly divergent interests with China: India, Indonesia, Japan, and Vietnam. All four countries view themselves as having rightful degrees of regional influence that would appear to clash with China’s conception. There are other cases in which smaller countries may have well-developed identities of independence and autonomy that conflict with China’s presumed degree of control. Examples are Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore.