【英文】AidData报告：北京如何利用经济、社会和网络关系沿丝绸之路施加影响（82页）

With six countries in the region—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,  Nepal, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—PRC leaders  have historically employed an extraction strategy at the local  level, heavily weighted towards financial diplomacy.  Although the six countries are highly disparate in terms of  income, geographic proximity, and regional zones of  influence, they have two commonalities: (i) large numbers of  districts that offer access to ready supplies of energy via oil,  natural gas, or hydropower potential;11 and (ii) strategic  positioning to Beijing’s envisioned overland or maritime  transit routes. In keeping with this strategy, most of the PRC’s  financial diplomacy at the subnational level in these  countries has been focused on the energy and  transportation sectors.  Although India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka all attracted  sizable financial diplomacy, Beijing focused its subnational  strategy on cultural and exchange to nudge foreign publics  to view the PRC more favorably. 

Like the previous group,  India, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka are strategically positioned  for Beijing’s envisioned overland or maritime transit routes.  However, they have fewer districts that offer ready access to  oil and natural gas deposits (only 23 districts as compared to  72 districts in the previous six countries). Moreover, China  may have recognized its need to rely more heavily on soft  power in India, to refurbish its image with the public in the  context of a geostrategic rivalry characterized by mutual  suspicion, and in Sri Lanka, following the fallout from  Beijing’s controversial bankrolling of Hambantota port and  related investments (Thompson, 2001; Thompson & Dreyer,  2011; Custer et al., 2019a).  Beijing’s historical engagement with Afghanistan was  notable primarily for its relative absence.