【英文】兰德报告：日本可能获得远程对地攻击导弹及其对美日同盟的影响（53页）

英文研究报告 2022年03月22日 08:02 管理员

As noted earlier, the growth of China’s military spending and its ability to use that spending to generate increased military power over the past three decades has been impressive. According to Japan’s Ministry of Defense, the nominal size of China’s announced national defense budget grew approximately 44-fold in the past 30 years and more than doubled over the past decade.5 The PLA has been strengthening its military capability across the board and increasing its ability to operate in the space and cyberspace domains and in the electromagnetic spectrum.6 It has also made organizational reforms to advance its ability to wage joint operations and to mobilize private resources through the Military-Civil Fusion Development Strategy to further enhance their military capabilities.

For Japan, the most-serious military threats arise from the prospect of a crisis over the Senkaku Islands or Taiwan in which the Chinese leadership decides to use force—possibly in the form of invasion. There are different views about the immediate likelihood of those crises erupting, but as of this writing, trends in Chinese behavior are not reassuring. China continues to take unilateral revisionist actions and coerce other states that rebuke Chinese policy and claims on various issues. If China were to attack U.S. Forces, Japan (USFJ) and Japanese territory in the event of a major crisis—such as an invasion of Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands, or both—China could use a diverse set of military means, such as waging cyberattacks against networks of the SDF and USFJ and launching air and missile attacks against U.S. bases in Japan and the western Pacific, as well as SDF bases.8 Table 2.1 lists the weapons China could employ.