【英文】法国蒙田研究所报告：欧洲半导体：产业政策的回归（31页）

英文研究报告 2022年04月12日 06:45 管理员

The European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association records a decrease of 2.4% in registrations of passenger cars in the EU in 2021 – the worst performance since 1990. 4 The shortage has also affected medical devices, video game consoles, entry-level smartphones, laptops, and smart appliances. The US Department of Commerce identifed the need for additional fab capacity for some market segments as the main bottleneck in overcoming the current shortages, assessed to be lasting into 2023 for some products. 5 How to explain shortages? Covid-19 has generated disruptions in supply chain segments by disorganizing purchase orders during lockdown periods. Moreover, geopolitics has aggravated the problem – Huawei alone spent USD 23 billion on stockpiling components in 2019 to anticipate future restrictions on technology transfers. 6 But rising demand is a simple structural factor.

Indeed, there were already tensions in the equipment supply to manufacture 200 mm wafers as early as 2020. 7 As a critical short-term issue for many industries, the shortages point to the existence of chokepoints, which raise the question of resilience in supply chains. What can companies and public authorities do to anticipate and prevent disruption of the procurement of components? In Europe, the issue yields a new awareness of geopolitical risk in East Asia and US-China relations. Ursula von der Leyen describes the fact that most of Europe’s supplies come from outside Europe as a “dependency and uncertainty we simply cannot afford”. 8 Thierry Breton looks at the other side of the coin, stressing that the EU’s policies aim to “secure our supply chain in partnership with trusted players across the globe”. 9 This logic is not limited to semiconductors – nanoelectronics is one of fve critical industrial sectors that have triggered an awakening in Europe regarding risks of disruptions and the need for supply chain resilience.