【英文】法国蒙田研究所报告：欧洲半导体：产业政策的回归（31页）

The European Automobile Manufacturers’ Association records a decrease of 2.4%  in registrations of passenger cars in the EU in 2021 – the worst performance since  1990. 4 The shortage has also affected medical devices, video game consoles,  entry-level smartphones, laptops, and smart appliances. The US Department of  Commerce identifed the need for additional fab capacity for some market segments  as the main bottleneck in overcoming the current shortages, assessed to be lasting  into 2023 for some products. 5 How to explain shortages? Covid-19 has generated disruptions in supply chain segments by disorganizing purchase orders during lockdown periods. Moreover, geopolitics has aggravated the problem – Huawei alone spent USD 23 billion on stockpiling  components in 2019 to anticipate future restrictions on technology transfers. 6 But  rising demand is a simple structural factor. 

Indeed, there were already tensions  in the equipment supply to manufacture 200 mm wafers as early as 2020. 7 As a critical short-term issue for many industries, the shortages point to the existence of chokepoints, which raise the question of resilience in supply chains. What  can companies and public authorities do to anticipate and prevent disruption of the  procurement of components? In Europe, the issue yields a new awareness of  geopolitical risk in East Asia and US-China relations. Ursula von der Leyen  describes the fact that most of Europe’s supplies come from outside Europe as a  “dependency and uncertainty we simply cannot afford”. 8 Thierry Breton looks at the  other side of the coin, stressing that the EU’s policies aim to “secure our supply  chain in partnership with trusted players across the globe”. 9 This logic is not limited  to semiconductors – nanoelectronics is one of fve critical industrial sectors  that have triggered an awakening in Europe regarding risks of disruptions  and the need for supply chain resilience.