【英文】太平洋论坛报告：探讨中美之间的相互脆弱性（94页）

英文研究报告 2022年06月21日 06:31 管理员

Small powers such as North Korea and Iran dominated the international security agenda when the late Thérèse Delpech wrote these words for her book¾her last¾on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, which was published shortly after she passed away in 2012. In it, Delpech analyzed the challenge posed by small powers but warned about the very real possibility of a renewed and much more dangerous competition between the major powers, notably the United States, China, and Russia. Ten years later, the return of major power competition is a reality. That shift was confirmed in the mid-2010s, after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and after, around that same time, it became clear that China had embraced a more assertive posture, especially in the East and South China Seas. US relations with both countries have deteriorated sharply since, with no sign of improvement.

On the contrary, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and China’s increasingly belligerent actions vis-à-vis Taiwan, more troubles might be brewing. The United States has taken stock of these developments, expressing it most clearly in the 2017 National Security Strategy, in which it labels China and Russia “revisionist powers” because “they are contesting [US] geopolitical advantage and trying to change the international order in their favor.”2 The 2018 National Defense Strategy puts it even more starkly, stressing that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition” with both countries, especially China.3 While the Joe Biden administration, in office since 2021, is yet to release its key strategic reviews, this theme will remain front and center in US foreign policy. Significantly, the 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance lays out a preliminary agenda in which the Biden administration plans to strengthen US “enduring advantages” to “prevail in strategic competition with China and any other nation.