【英文】太平洋论坛报告：探讨中美之间的相互脆弱性（94页）

Small powers such as North Korea and Iran  dominated the international security agenda when  the late Thérèse Delpech wrote these words for her  book¾her last¾on Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century, which was published shortly after she  passed away in 2012. In it, Delpech analyzed the  challenge posed by small powers but warned about  the very real possibility of a renewed and much more  dangerous competition between the major powers,  notably the United States, China, and Russia. Ten years later, the return of major power  competition is a reality. That shift was confirmed in  the mid-2010s, after Russia annexed Crimea in 2014  and after, around that same time, it became clear that  China had embraced a more assertive posture,  especially in the East and South China Seas. US  relations with both countries have deteriorated  sharply since, with no sign of improvement. 

On the  contrary, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in  February 2022 and China’s increasingly belligerent  actions vis-à-vis Taiwan, more troubles might be  brewing. The United States has taken stock of these  developments, expressing it most clearly in the 2017  National Security Strategy, in which it labels China and  Russia “revisionist powers” because “they are  contesting [US] geopolitical advantage and trying to  change the international order in their favor.”2 The  2018 National Defense Strategy puts it even more  starkly, stressing that “the central challenge to US  prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term,  strategic competition” with both countries, especially  China.3 While the Joe Biden administration, in office  since 2021, is yet to release its key strategic reviews,  this theme will remain front and center in US foreign  policy. Significantly, the 2021 Interim National Security  Strategic Guidance lays out a preliminary agenda in  which the Biden administration plans to strengthen  US “enduring advantages” to “prevail in strategic  competition with China and any other nation.