【英文】兰德报告：在印太地区与中国有效竞争的同时管理升级（349页）

英文研究报告 2023年01月04日 07:59 管理员

Case 1 tests the hypothesis that China is more likely to respond aggressively to U.S. or allied actions or capabilities that it perceives constitute a threat to the PRC regime or physical security by examining Chinese reactions to the U.S. development of LRHWs. Chinese experts, as well as the PLA, have watched this development closely. They express significant concern over two threats that LRHWs could pose to China in the future: First, Chinese sources argue that LRHWs could negate China’s counter-intervention or A2/AD bubble, thus threatening China’s ability to win future wars. Second, they warn that LRHWs could potentially degrade China’s C2 and nuclear forces during a conflict. China has taken a number of steps in response. First, it is developing its own hypersonic weapons. Second, it is bolstering its nuclear deterrent posture. Third, it appears to be leveraging deliberate ambiguity about the parameters of its No First Use policy in order to deter conventional attacks on its nuclear forces. Chinese analysis directly ties these reactions to China’s perceptions of the threat that U.S. deployment of LRHWs would pose to nuclear stability and the regional military balance. This provides strong support for the hypothesis.

U.S. Hypersonic Weapons Development and Potential Deployment to the Indo-Pacific DoD is developing hypersonic weapons as part of its conventional prompt global strike program.314 There has been increased discussion of deploying LRHWs to the Indo-Pacific region, as well as discussions on where to base the new capability. The Army plans to integrate hypersonic weapons into its Long-Range Precision Fires capability set, which could be useful for penetrating and disintegrating A2/AD bubbles in accordance with MDO doctrine. LRHWs’ combination of ballistic missile-like speed, cruise missile-like maneuverability, and accuracy give the United States new abilities to strike critical targets, and their relatively low detectability and high survivability allow for a more assured response. Long-range fires also increase the United States’ ability to threaten punishment if an adversary action is taken. These are also theater-level hypersonic weapons that can be visibly emplaced in the region beforehand, which can be used to signal intent and resolve.315 By threatening to defeat the primary means of potential Chinese aggression, the U.S. military considers LRHWs to serve as a strategic deterrent in peacetime. However, some experts worry about the implications of LRHWs for strategic stability because of their incredible speed, which compresses the time available for decisionmaking and, therefore, complicates deterrence.