【英文】美国国防大学报告：1996年台海危机的经验教训：防止升级和战争（68页）

National Defense University’s Center for the Study of Chinese Military Afairs was tasked  by the Ofce of the Secretary of Defense for Policy to examine prospects for escalation control  in a potential future Taiwan Strait crisis by revisiting the 1995–1996 crisis. This study assesses  information-sharing, communication, and policy coordination between U.S. and Taiwan decisionmakers, as well as examining how both sides gauged China’s intentions during the crisis and  which indicators and information most shaped their decisions and responses. The study examines what has changed since 1996 to identify challenges and implications for U.S. and Taiwan  policymakers in a future crisis.

This study relies heavily on the perspectives and assessments of ofcials present in key government, intelligence, and military positions in the United States and Taiwan during the crisis,  and experts who analyzed the crisis and who contribute to today’s discussion of cross-strait relations. Te authors drew upon oral histories and interviewed 17 former U.S. Government ofcials,  intelligence ofcers, and academics to gather these perspectives, as well as 12 of their Taiwan  counterparts. These interviews provide the foundation of the assessments in this report. Tis  report does not include any classifed information, but the authors reviewed contemporaneous  U.S. diplomatic and intelligence reporting to confrm material from unclassifed interviews and  place it in context.