【英文】美国战略和预算评估中心报告：太平洋战争的中国教训：对解放军作战的启示（112页）

英文研究报告 2023年02月06日 07:25 管理员

General Secretary Xi Jinping unveiled his ambitious vision for the PLA at the 19th Party Congress in October 2017. At the all-important meeting, Xi pledged “to create a mighty force for realizing the Chinese Dream and the dream of building a powerful military.” Notably, he set a timetable: the PLA would “basically complete” its modernization by 2035 and be “fully transformed into a world-class military” by mid-century.5 During the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, Xi reaffirmed his commitment to raising the PLA to “world-class standards.”6 While the phrase “world-class military” remains undefined, the term implies parity with, if not superiority in various respects to, the U.S. armed forces. A world-class military also connotes the capacity to influence events and to project power far beyond China’s shores.

As the PLA strives to become a world-class military, it will need to consider a far wider range of contingencies, roles, and missions than in the recent past. Its rapid modernization over the past three decades has furnished diverse means hitherto unavailable to Chinese statesmen and commanders. In addition to its formidable anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, China will field a general-purpose expeditionary force capable of fulfilling many tasks closer to home and in distant theaters. In the coming decades, the PLA will possess the tools to selectively command the local commons, project power, and seize strategic terrain across the Indo-Pacific and beyond. An increasingly globalized PLA also suggests that a local war will not likely be geographically confined and could well horizontally escalate to extra-regional theaters.