【英文】战略与国际问题研究中心报告：中国去杠杆化举措的经济影响（101页）

In December 2016, a small securities company called Sealand Securities indicated it might refuse to honor  some esoteric forms of entrusted bond contracts, in which securities companies would temporarily warehouse  bonds for banks or other third parties. The bonds involved were safer policy bank bonds, but the concern  that spread through the market was that other NBFIs might walk away from similar deals. As a result, banks  stopped lending to NBFIs in the same volumes, and there was quickly a liquidity squeeze in the market, given  that NBFIs were the primary borrowers throughout China’s interbank market. In order to calm the squeeze,  the PBOC even needed to extend trading hours on some days in order to prevent defaults on interbank  payments, which had touched of the June 2013 crisis. 

Then, regulators, led by the China Securities Regulatory  Commission (CSRC), needed to gather the creditors of the frm into a meeting over the weekend in order to  manage the resulting fallout and prevent further contagion. More generally, the Sealand Securities scandal exposed an uncomfortable reality for the PBOC and its  deleveraging efort: the potential for overstepping and triggering unintended consequences was readily  apparent. The market contagion from credit risk among even very small institutions caused a signifcant  sell-of in China’s fxed-income markets and forced regulators to directly intervene, refusing to allow Sealand  to back away from the contracts. Even as the PBOC was trying to break the pattern, market stability in China  depended upon widespread implicit guarantees. Any deviation from that pattern led to immediate shocks and  market instability.