【英文】ITIF报告：2023汉密尔顿指数：中国主导全球战略产业（131页）

The 10 industries’collective production represented 11.8 percent of the global economy in  2020, about the same as 25 years prior, having rebounded from a dip to 10.6 percent following  the global financial crisis of 2008 that saw steeper declines in goods output than overall gross  domestic product (GDP). (See figure 2.) However, the mix has changed, with the IT and  information services share growing 34 percent since 2002. The fact that the overall share of the  global economy comprising this advanced industry output has not changed underscores the zerosum competition between nations. Indeed, there is a noticeable correlation between strength in  these industries and nations’ balance of trade. (See Appendix B: Advanced Industries’ Relationship to National Trade Balances.) Nations are, or at least should be, competing  intensively for a greater share of this fixed pie. China certainly is. For the United States, losing  this race, either because policymakers are indifferent to the country’s industrial structure or  because they choose to focus on other economic or societal goals, would be catastrophic, as it  would turn the United States into a deindustrialized, United Kingdom-like economy. Time is  short. The 2020s are likely to be the decisive decade in which to turn around U.S. advanced  industry fortunes, because once China gains sufficient global market share, allied and U.S.  production risks being permanently weakened.