2023-11-01 19 英文报告下载
However, the same does not hold true for development programs funded directly by each government. AidData estimates suggest that China provided only $16 billion (over the five-year period analyzed) in overall programs directly from government sources that were not routed through an SOE or SOB.60 These estimates pale in comparison to estimates of official U.S. development assistance and cooperation from the U.S. government over this same period, which totaled just over $176 billion. Combining both (1) direct government sources and (2) SOBs and SOEs in the aggregate, these data suggest that China outspent the United States in the developing world by at least $120 billion (or 51 percent) between 2013 and 2017—a significant margin over five years, albeit not an overwhelming mismatch in each country’s reliance on development assistance and cooperation as a tool of economic statecraft, at least in percentage terms.
The gap between U.S. and Chinese assistance has likely narrowed even further in recent years. Recent estimates suggest that Chinese overseas lending peaked in 2016 and has continued to decline since that time, although it is not clear by how much.It is worth noting, however, that this overall picture of the volume of U.S. and Chinese economic engagement in the developing world is incomplete at best, given that it conflates the role played by such semi-governmental Chinese entities as SOEs and SOBs solely with that of the roles played by such U.S. government agencies as DFC and Export-Import Bank. Specifically, such a comparison neglects the independent role of the U.S. private sector—particularly as an analogue to Chinese private-sector-like entities with competing motives for profit, full employment, and continued subsidization by the state—in carrying out comparable investments and financing in the developing world.