【英文】美国信息技术与创新委员会报告：与中国竞争：战略框架（26页）

As with our declinist scenario, and as summarized in figure 5, our four-part model can help  define a set of more-positive changes that significantly raise the Western game and put today’s  anger to practical use. Importantly, bipartisan support is achievable in many of these areas if  there is a will to make this an overriding national priority. If 20 high-level policy efforts are  broadly followed, U.S. and Western positions versus China would almost certainly improve over  course of the 2020s. Let’s look at each dimension in turn. FIVE STEPS FOR REBALANCING SUPPLY CHAINS 1. Require operational transparency. Requiring U.S. and Western companies to publish  information about the size of their China operations in terms of revenues, value of  imported goods, technology-transfer activity, critical dependencies, investments,  partnerships, and similar information would provide both transparency and measurable  data so changes could be tracked over time. 

Such reporting is analogous to today’s  efforts to get companies to produce more-detailed carbon emissions data.) Transparency  is the only way to really understand the dynamics behind today’s trade deficit. It’s a lowcost, high-value area. 2. Provide financial incentives to reduce dependencies. Many firms are already diversifying  their production to become less dependent on China, but direct financial incentives, in  the form of grants or tax breaks, could accelerate the process, as they are now doing in  Japan. In the United States’ case, some work will come back to America, but countries  such as Vietnam, Mexico, and India will also likely benefit, which would weaken China.  There are modest costs to such programs, but also tangible value—and this would be a  sign of real change, especially when combined with the previously mentioned reporting  requirements. A case in point is recently proposed legislation to support the U.S.  semiconductor industry that includes incentives for companies to establish fabs in the  United States.