【英文】外交政策研究所报告：航母战斗群布置在哪里？美国国家战略与未来选择（156页）

英文研究报告 2021年10月08日 16:13 管理员

To build the force of 15 carriers, we froze the design of the Nimitz class and built fve more on fxed-price contracts that varied only in the steady introduction of ever-improving weapons technology. With the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols “reforms,” decisions on new weapons were taken from the services and given to the signifcantly enlarged Defense Department bureaucracy. Under this new joint system, it was decided that the Navy should have a new carrier design. Tat new vessel’s systems and design were decided not by the service, but rather by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council ( JROC).

This Pentagon council of the Vice Chiefs of the Armed Services and chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staf is charged generally with the assessment and approval of any “joint” capability felded in support of the NationalDefense Strategy (NDS).22 While nominally a good idea, sometimes the JROC adds too many capabilities or makes decisions that result in poor outcomes. In the case of the Ford-class carrier, the desire to feld so many transformational technologies and capabilities in one platform has resulted in the proverbial “design by committee of a horse” that results in a camel. USS Gerald R. Ford has been an unmitigated disaster. Started in 2008, it was some fve years late and more than double the cost of the last Nimitz-class ship.23 As of this writing, it may not be able to deploy for several more years.