【英文】德国外交关系理事会报告：中国的数字力量对欧盟的影响评估（106页）

Historically, integrated device manufacturers (IDM), such as Infineon, NXP or ST  Microelectronics, took care of ATP inhouse in their own back-end fabs. Backend processes are also often outsourced  to foundries such as TSMC or Globalfoundries, however, or to specialist outsourced semiconductor assembly and  test (OSAT) companies such as ASE  Group or Amkor Technologies.30  The economics of back-end manufacturing – relatively labour-intensive with low  value-add and narrow profit margins –  led increasingly to it being outsourced  to China, Taiwan and other countries in  Southeast Asia. While the back-end market is substantially less concentrated by  market share than cutting edge frontend manufacturing, it is to some extent  geographically concentrated. More than  60% of global ATP capacity is currently  located in Taiwan and China,31 which includes the back-end fabs of Western  companies located in China and Taiwan.

Chinese OSAT companies have  been especially successful, growing their  global market share to around 20% by  2020.The back end of the semiconductor  value chain is receiving sustained attention from policymakers in China. The  Chinese state, from senior leaders in Beijing down through provincial and municipal governments, is focused on promoting coordinated development of the entire value chain, including investment in  ATP capacity expansion and technological advances.34 This presents challenges  for Europe – in terms not just of the  semiconductor value chain, but also of  the multiple industries and technological  ecosystems built on it. It has far-reaching implications for national security and  the global balance of economic, political  and ideational power.