【英文】经济学人智库报告：俄乌战争如何重塑亚洲地缘政治和经济发展（18页）

英文研究报告 2022年06月08日 07:20 管理员

Asia’s direct goods trade exposure to Russia and Ukraine is low. Neither country is a signifcant export destination or source of imports for any Asian country. Supply-chain disruption from the confict will be much lower than in Europe. Still, there are areas of import exposure. Russia represents a meaningful source of energy supply for China, Japan and South Korea. While our baseline assumption is that international sanctions will not compromise access to Russia’s oil and natural gas, there may still be a desire among importers (especially US allies) to shift to alternative supply. Other niche dependencies include reliance on Russia and Ukraine as a source of fertiliser and grain in South-east and South Asia, which could cause disruption in the agricultural sector. North-east Asia—home to the world’s leading chipmakers—also has some exposure to any disruption in the supply of rare gases used in semiconductor production.

There will be export benefts for some countries from higher commodity prices and a global search for alternative supply. Net exporters of coal (Australia, Indonesia, Mongolia), crude oil (Brunei, Malaysia) and liquefed natural gas (Australia, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia) will be energy producers to watch. A loss of Russian nickel supply will provide tailwinds for Indonesia and New Caledonia, while Australia and India may play a role in plugging the gap in global wheat supply. Risk-aversion in fnancial markets could also trigger capital outfows from the region, pressurising emerging-market currencies (which were already vulnerable to depreciation as a result of rising US interest rates this year). A further indirect concern is whether geopolitical tensions could prompt reprisal measures targeting countries that back measures against Russia. Cyber-attacks and punitive economic policies are potential areas to watch.