【英文】经济学人智库报告：俄乌战争如何重塑亚洲地缘政治和经济发展（18页）

Asia’s direct goods trade exposure to Russia and Ukraine is low. Neither country is a signifcant  export destination or source of imports for any Asian country. Supply-chain disruption from the  confict will be much lower than in Europe.  Still, there are areas of import exposure. Russia represents a meaningful source of energy supply for  China, Japan and South Korea. While our baseline assumption is that international sanctions will  not compromise access to Russia’s oil and natural gas, there may still be a desire among importers  (especially US allies) to shift to alternative supply.  Other niche dependencies include reliance on Russia and Ukraine as a source of fertiliser and grain  in South-east and South Asia, which could cause disruption in the agricultural sector. North-east  Asia—home to the world’s leading chipmakers—also has some exposure to any disruption in the  supply of rare gases used in semiconductor production.

There will be export benefts for some countries from higher commodity prices and a global search  for alternative supply. Net exporters of coal (Australia, Indonesia, Mongolia), crude oil (Brunei,  Malaysia) and liquefed natural gas (Australia, Papua New Guinea, Malaysia) will be energy producers  to watch. A loss of Russian nickel supply will provide tailwinds for Indonesia and New Caledonia,  while Australia and India may play a role in plugging the gap in global wheat supply.  Risk-aversion in fnancial markets could also trigger capital outfows from the region, pressurising  emerging-market currencies (which were already vulnerable to depreciation as a result of rising US  interest rates this year).  A further indirect concern is whether geopolitical tensions could prompt reprisal measures targeting  countries that back measures against Russia. Cyber-attacks and punitive economic policies are  potential areas to watch.