【英文】新美国安全中心报告：危险海峡，未来台湾冲突的战争模拟（20页）

The Red team sought to force Taipei to capitulate  before Blue’s forces could recover from Red’s opening  blow. Red aimed to decapitate Taiwan’s leadership,  launch punitive strikes to erode Taiwan’s will to resist,  and cut of communications to the island to reduce  Taipei’s strategic messaging aimed at rallying international support. Alongside these strategic attacks, Red  sought to rapidly ferry ground forces to beaches and  ports in northern Taiwan, in addition to airdropping  forces in the same region, to capture Taipei as quickly  as possible. Red believed this would generate enough  momentum to conquer the northern half of the island  and compel the rest of the country to surrender. The  United States and its allies would then face the unpalatable prospect of rolling back Red’s territorial gains,  which would be incredibly difcult—if not impossible— and ultimately conclude that it was not worth the cost.16 Red’s quick victory proved elusive. 

Enabled by its  control of the skies over Taiwan, Red amphibious,  airborne, and air assault invasion forces made it ashore,  but encountered ferce resistance.17 Red forces occupied  a beach and airfeld north of Taipei but sufered heavy  losses. When the game ended, Red’s invasion force still  had to traverse mountainous and heavily defended  terrain to reach the capital. Moreover, Red also had to  fnd a way to provide fuel, food, and ammunition to its  forces ashore while Blue forces attacked its vulnerable  lines of communication.18 Ultimately, neither side was able to decisively win  in the initial week of fghting. Both Red and Blue had  expended large portions of their inventories of precision long-range missiles, lost many fghter aircraft,  and needed to resupply and rearm forces under attack.  However, Red still had civilian assets it could use to  continue its cross-strait invasion, aided by its geographic  proximity to Taiwan.