【英文】国际战略研究中心报告：制裁对俄罗斯经济的影响和对中国实施制裁的教训（43页）

英文研究报告 2023年03月15日 08:31 管理员

The Kremlin’s “Fortress Russia” strategy arose in response to these sanctions. Its goal was to render Russia a self-reliant economy with a “fortress” balance sheet designed to protect the country from future balance-ofpayments shocks and further sanctions. Moscow achieved this goal in four ways. First, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) carried out a substantial de-dollarization of its assets because it believed U.S. assets would be the most at risk of future sanctions. Beginning in 2018, the CBR reallocated its reserves away from U.S. dollar assets, with the euro accounting for 32 percent of CBR reserve assets by mid-2021 and the remainder in gold (22 percent), U.S. dollars (16 percent), renminbi (13 percent), and other currencies (17 percent).

Second, Moscow reinforced its conservative fscal posture, including by assuming low oil prices.10 Russia’s public debt—about 75 percent of which is domestic—was fairly stable after 2014 and jumped to $290 billion, or 16 percent of GDP, in 2021 only because of the Covid-19 pandemic.11 Russia’s public and private sectors reduced foreign currencydenominated external debt for all sectors from $539 billion in early 2014 to $350 billion by the end of 2021.12 Third, the CBR built up foreign reserves by intervening to limit ruble appreciation. As a result, Russia’s foreign reserves nearly doubled from 2015 to 2022, from $356 billion to over $630 billion (Figure 1).13 Finally, Moscow attempted to spur self-sufciency in agricultural and industrial goods with subsidies and embargoes on Western food imports.14 In the industrial sector, self-sufciency largely failed: Russia’s machine tools and electronics, for example, have remained reliant on foreign inputs.