【英文】瑞信报告：全球股票策略：新冠疫情的长期影响（109页）

英文研究报告 2020年05月19日 06:20 管理员

Moreover, we think we are likely to get a redistribution of income to the poor (e.g. higher minimum wages) and the poor tend to have a savings ratio that is very low while the wealthy (who will be disproportionately taxed) have a very high savings ratio and this could therefore counter any rise in the savings ratio. We also think that into a recovery, fiscal easing is likely to favour schemes that focus on direct spending (e.g. vouchers with expiration dates to drive immediate consumption). Investment tends to recover when capacity utilisation troughs and GDP growth is above 2% Importantly, it does not require capacity utilisation to return to average levels for investment to pick up.

The steps above are targeted to preserve the prospect of a V-shaped bounce-back by keeping firms in business. For GDP to return to its previous trend will require ongoing monetary and fiscal support even after the level of GDP seen at the end of 2019 has been reached. On the monetary side, we strongly believe that central banks will not only allow an inflationary overshoot, but increasingly target such an outcome. After all, even before the pandemic broke out, the Fed was undertaking an annual review of its inflation target, with serious consideration being given to a ‘make-up’ strategy, in which any inflation shortfall should be made up with a subsequent inflation overshoot, as well as potentially even raising the inflation target. The ECB was also set to undergo its first formal policy review in November. The big debate in our view is around what happens to fiscal policy. If we look at the aftermath of the GFC, fiscal policy was quickly tightened if we look at the US or DM, diminishing the policy support for growth significantly.